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and the suffix *αρ*, which is the same in both words whatever it represents. It is further objected that the feminine form *πίειρα* cannot bear the same relation to *πίαρ* that *μάκαιρα* does to its masculine. But Curtius, Gr. Etym. No. 455, says: "*μάγειρος* ist wohl aus älterem *μαγαρο-ς* wie *ξταιρος* aus *ξταρο-ς*, *δνειρος* aus *δναρ* abgeleitet." These examples furnish analogy for the change of *α* to *ε* and of the metathesis of the *ι*. But it is thought that *πίειρα* as a feminine to *πίων* is justified by the analogy of *πέπων*, *πέπειρα*, and that they are all to be referred to a group (cf. Mehlhorn Griech. Gram. 1845) of adjectives forming their feminines with the suffix *-ειρα*, to which are also referred *πρέσβυς*, *πρέσβειρα* and *ἱλαος*, *ἰλάειρα*. But there existed (date uncertain) a masculine *πέπειρος*, and *ἰλάειρα* is probably to be referred to *ἱλαρός* (vid. Lobeck Paralip. p. 210); hence, with the exception of *πρέσβυς*, none of this group of five can be quoted against the proposed theory, while some of them support it. But the metaplastic (?) nominatives *μάχαρος* (vid. Boeckh T. I. 449 b.) and *πιαρός* (cf. the adj. *φαρός* from *ψάρ*) can scarcely be more than illustrated by reference to the Sanskrit stem *pīvara*.

The existence, then, of an adjective form *πίαρ* parallel to *πίων* may be inferred:

1. From the interpretation of the two passages quoted.
2. From the testimony of Hesychius.
3. From the survival of the corresponding feminine form *πίειρα*, supported by the analogy of *μάχαρ* and other words.

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JE NE SACHE PAS.

Mr. Samuel Garner, in his remarks on *je ne sache pas*, in the second number of this Journal, gives his reasons why he does not believe *sache* in that phrase to be a subjunctive, and concludes with the words, "It is an indicative or it is nothing."

If this statement be correct, the phrase *je ne sache pas* ought to be equivalent to *je ne sais pas*; but whoever has observed how Frenchmen use the phrase in question, knows that such is not the case. I do not see any reason to doubt the correctness of Bescherelle's remark, that it is "une des nombreuses délicatesses" of the French language, or to differ from Mr. Littré when he says: "D'ailleurs le sens dénote un subjonctif plutôt qu'un indicatif; car *je ne sache pas* implique quelque chose de plus dubitatif que

je ne sais pas, et ce doute on l'explique en substituant le subjonctif à l'indicatif," etc.

If we admit this distinction universally felt and recognized by Frenchmen, the mere possibility that there may have been an old indicative *sache*, which would be phonetically derivable from *sapio*, is no strong proof that *sache* in the above phrase is the indicative. Mr. Littré, as I understand him, does not make "the assertion that *sache* from *sapio* is phonetically impossible," or "that *sache* is not derivable from *sapio*"; but he says: "L'explication (viz. that *sache* is the indicative) ne peut être admise, car *sapio* a donné *sai*; et *sache* vient de *sapiam*," which, I presume, means that the explanation cannot be considered of any value because we know that *sapio* has given *sai* (*sais*) and *sapiam*, *sache*, while we have nothing to show that *sapio* has given *sache*, although such might have been the case, (*sapius*, *sage*; *rubeus*, *rouge*).

On the other hand, if Mr. Garner terms Mr. Littré's explanation of *je ne sache pas* by means of a preceding expression such as *j'ose dire* "purely conjectural," I am inclined to think that he overlooked in Littré two quotations from one author (Paré, Dédicace au lecteur), and evidently having the same force, viz. *Aussi osé-je dire que je ne sache homme si chatouilleux, qui ne . . .* and: *Je ne sache homme si peu versé en astrologie, qui . . .* These sentences, which are found in Littré a dozen lines below the example from Rabelais also quoted by Mr. Garner, show that Mr. Littré's theory is not entirely *aus der Luft gegriffen*.

The uniqueness of the construction *je ne sache pas* does not seem to me very startling; if it is an isolated expression, it is so on account of the tense rather than the mood. Analogous sentences are common in various languages; in Latin we have *non dixerim*, etc. (in Greek the optative with ἄν), in German *ich dachte, ich wusste nicht*, etc. In these and similar expressions the subjunctive is used in place of the indicative, "to soften the positiveness of the assertion." For the same reason *je ne sache pas* (*ich wusste nicht*) is used in place of *je ne sais pas* (*ich weiss nicht*).

In French too, the conditional (according to Diez, a tense of the subjunctive mood) of various verbs is used to express an affirmation doubtfully, e. g. *On dirait qu'il soit fou; j'aimerais mieux; je ne saurais vous le dire* (It. *non saprei*). The circumstance that *je ne saurais* received the meaning of *je ne puis, je ne peux*, may explain the use of the *present* tense in the case of *savoir*, especially because the use of *sache* and *saurais* seems to have originated about

the same period; we find also that before the conditional of *savoir* became equivalent to the present of *pouvoir*, *sauriez-vous* was used where one says now *sauriez-vous me dire*; as: *Sauriez-vous où demeure monsieur S.?* *Sauriez-vous me dire où demeure monsieur S.?* Further, the subordinate clause *que je sache* may have led to the use of *je ne sache pas* in the principal clause: *Ils n'ont pas étudié l'espagnol que je sache. Ont-ils étudié l'espagnol? Pas que je sache—Je ne sache pas qu'ils aient étudié l'espagnol.*

A special reason for softening assertions made with *savoir* is to be found in the meaning of this verb; it is easy to understand why a phrase like *je ne sache pas* should exist while a corresponding one with *croire* is wanting, since the latter verb itself implies uncertainty; and it will be observed that *je ne sache pas* occurs where the information of the speaker is *necessarily* only a partial one, and the evidence upon which the declaration is founded circumstantial. To say that "by using the subjunctive in the following clause sufficient indirectness or *délicatesse* may be secured," is making an assertion in the face of the undeniable fact that in the case of this verb French-speaking people feel the need of a still milder form of expression. In such sentences as *je ne crois pas qu'il vienne, non credo che venga*, it is not so much the subjunctive in the subordinate clause as the verb in the principal clause that makes the assertion doubtful; in English and German the indicative is the regular mood in this instance, and in Italian *che verrà* may take the place of *che venga*.

Concerning Mr. Garner's theory of an old French indicative *je sache*, etc., with which the imperative would correspond as in most other verbs, I would call attention to the Italian present indicative *so, sai, sapete*; pres. subj. *sappia, sappi, sappiate*; imperative *sappia, sappiate*. Here also the imperative has the forms of the subjunctive, while it has in other verbs those of the indicative. Are we to suppose that in Italian too a second form of the indicative existed, of which not a trace is left, as is the case with the hypothetical French indicative *sache*? Is not this exception attributable rather to the meaning of the verb, which does not admit of an imperative form in the same sense as the majority of verbs? We command a person *to go* or *learn*, but not with the same positiveness *to know*; do we not often translate such expressions as *wissen sie denn* or *sachez donc* by the potential or subjunctive?

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